Is “Garden Variety” Emotional Distress a Meaningful Limitation on FEHA Damages?

This article is for educational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.

The phrase “garden variety emotional distress” appears frequently in employment litigation. Lawyers use it in discovery disputes, settlement discussions, motions in limine, and post-trial motions to challenge jury verdicts. Despite its widespread use, California law has never provided a clear legal definition of the term. More importantly, California courts have not treated “garden variety emotional distress” as a legal limitation on recoverable damages.

The California Court of Appeal’s recent 2026 decision in Glick v. City of Los Angeles (California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, Case No. B334953) highlights that the phrase “garden variety emotional distress” really is just something attorneys, mediators and judges say to frame the damages portion of cases.

At trial, the Glick jury awarded substantial noneconomic and economic damages to two officers who were not involved in committing battery on an arrestee, but who were the only two of many potential officers who could have committed the battery which were “benched” and sidelined from duty during the investigation. For example, each plaintiff officer’s female partner involved in the arrest of the party was not similarly benched or sidelined. Investigators reasoned that the types of battery (in this case pranks committed on the arrestee’s person like drawing a penis on his abdomen and shaving his eyebrows while unconscious) were not the type a woman would typically commit.

What Type of Evidence did the Glick Jury Hear About Emotional Damages?

In part, Glick testified: (1) that he was upset during the investigation into the battery and the enforcement actions taken against him, including being upset and crying when he was notified of the Board of Rights hearing against him; (2) that these stresses were ongoing, to the point where he had a hard time rolling out of bed; (3) that he was stressed out at this time because he had just become a first-time father and did not know how he was going to financially support his family; (4) that he was upset because he was concerned that he would not be able to transfer into the Metro Division and continue his upward career trajectory with the LAPD; and (5) that the events stemming from the investigation and enforcement actions contributed to a recurrence of his drinking alcohol, which at one point (several years later) led to him calling an LAPD helpline.” Id. at pp. 9-10.

In part, “Garcia testified: (1) that he felt embarrassed by being benched for eight or nine months, particularly since this was the only time he had ever been benched; (2) that he was shocked when he received notice of the Board of Rights hearing; (3) that he did not allow himself to be down on himself for too long, as he had to take care of his family financially; (4) that within a week of being sent home, he was working an off-duty security job; (5) that this was the lowest point in his entire career; (6) that he felt hurt by the LAPD’s actions toward him, particularly because he had been loyal to the LAPD and given them his life (including being in witness protection as a gang expert); (7) that his wife was deeply upset by the situation, and that her emotions in turn affected him; (8) that he never told his daughters about what occurred because he wanted to remain a role model to them. Id. at p. 10.

The city moved for a new trial to reduce the plaintiffs’ awards, arguing that the economic and noneconomic damages were excessive. Agreeing with the Defendant, and as to emotional distress damages, the trial court used the “garden variety” label stating that plaintiffs had “only sought and argued for garden-variety emotional distress” and characterized the evidence supporting the noneconomic damages as “scant.” Glick at p. 5. The court noted the absence of any testimony from psychologists, psychiatrists, or treating physicians. Id.

In reversing the remittitur order, and affirming the jury’s awards, the appellate court held that the trial court may not impose a categorical ceiling or cap on emotional distress damages simply because it characterizes the evidence as “garden variety.”

The Glick opinion underscores both the significant role the jury plays in evaluating subjective issues like emotional distress damages and that use of the phrase “garden variety” is a colloquial label used by the legal profession rather than a recognized category of damages under California law.

California Law Focuses on the Evidence, Not Party Labels of “Garden Variety” or “Severe” Emotional Distress

California has long recognized that emotional distress damages are inherently individualized and cases like Glick serve to remind us that emotional distress claims cannot be calculated through formulas or objective measurements.

FEHA authorizes recovery for emotional harm resulting from unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, and the jury is entrusted with evaluating the nature and extent of that harm to the degree that it is not beyond the jury’s abilities to comprehend the evidence.

Common evidentiary factors utilized by both plaintiff and defense counsel to evaluate whether an emotional distress claim falls within the “garden variety” or “severe” range include:

  • Witness credibility
  • Plaintiff’s testimony and the testimony of others such as co-workers, and family members
  • Contemporaneous notes or a journal or diary Plaintiff kept documenting their feelings
  • Documentation like emails demonstrating exchanges which support either party’s claim
  • The duration of the alleged emotional distress, is it temporary or long term
  • whether the plaintiff’s alleged condition was diagnosed
  • whether medical or therapeutic treatment was required
  • the impact on the plaintiff’s daily life

These types of evidentiary factors underscore why California appellate courts, like the court in Glick, have repeatedly emphasized that emotional distress awards must be evaluated on their own records. Similarly, parties making comparisons to verdicts in other cases may provide context, but it does not establish fixed benchmarks or maximum recoveries where the award of damages should be individualized by definition.

Why Does the Label Persist?

Even if “garden variety” label has no technical legal significance under California damages law, the phrase continues to influence litigation.

During discovery, plaintiffs often describe or stipulate that their emotional distress is ordinary or “garden variety” rather than extraordinary or “severe.” This was the case in Glick. Doing so may help preserve objections to requests for mental health records or compulsory psychological examinations.

Defendants, on the other hand, may rely on the same characterization later in the case. If the plaintiff has consistently represented that the emotional injuries are “garden variety,” defendants may argue that the evidence does not support unusually large noneconomic damage awards.

This creates an interesting tension where the same description which may narrow discovery disputes can later become part of the damages debate.

The Glick court’s message is that courts should be careful not to allow the litigation shorthand of “garden variety” or “sever” emotional distress labels to become a substitute for analyzing the actual trial evidence.

Implications for Trial Practice

The decision may influence how both sides present emotional distress evidence at trial.

For plaintiffs, Glick reinforces the importance of developing detailed factual testimony regarding the effects of discrimination or retaliation. Emotional distress claims do not necessarily require psychiatric experts or medical diagnoses. Jurors often evaluate emotional harm through testimony describing changes in relationships, work performance, sleep, anxiety, confidence, and everyday functioning.

For defendants, the decision highlights the importance of challenging the factual foundation of emotional distress claims rather than relying primarily on generalized descriptions such as “garden variety.” Cross examination, contradictory evidence, and impeachment of the claimed emotional impact may carry greater weight than arguments based on labels alone.

The Glick opinion also affects post-trial practice. Trial courts retain the authority to order remittitur when damages are unsupported by the evidence or reflect passion or prejudice. However, Glick indicates that courts should not begin any remittitur analysis by imposing categorical assumptions about what a “garden variety” emotional distress claim is worth.

Settlement Considerations

Although Glick does not establish a new measure of damages, it may influence settlement discussions.

Employment lawyers often evaluate exposure by comparing verdicts involving similar allegations. Those comparisons remain useful, but Glick reminds practitioners that California appellate courts continue to view emotional distress damages as individualized and highly fact dependent.

As a result, post Glick, attempts to assign a predictable value based solely on whether emotional distress is described as “garden variety” may prove less persuasive than a careful assessment of the plaintiff’s testimony and the overall evidentiary record.

Looking Ahead

The terms “garden variety emotional distress” and “severe emotional distress” are unlikely to disappear from California employment litigation vocabulary. Instead, they remain convenient shorthand phrases which can help frame discovery disputes and describe the nature of a plaintiff’s emotional injury.

The Glick v. City of Los Angeles case demonstrates that these labels have limits. California law does not recognize a separate category of damages with its own ceiling or presumptive value. Whether an emotional distress award is appropriate depends on the evidence presented to the jury, not on the terminology lawyers or courts use to describe the claim.

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